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Using a qualitative analysis of disagreements from a referentially annotated newspaper corpus, we show
that, in coreference annotation, vague referents are prone to greater disagreement. We show how po-
tentially problematic cases can be dealt with in a way that is practical even for larger-scale annotation,
considering a real-world example from newspaper text.
1 Introduction
Since the early investigations by Hirschman et al. (1997) and the critique of the MUC-7 anno-
tation scheme put forward by van Deemter and Kibble (2000), several large corpora have been
annotated with coreference relations, with reﬁnements in terms of annotation schemes (Poesio,
2004), as well as in terms of support by the annotation tools.
AftervanDeemterandKibbleandtheircritiqueofcoreferenceinthecaseofboundanaphora,
critique of the concept of coreference itself came only from Poesio and Reyle (2001), who argue
that in the case of mereologically structured entities (both physical objects and abstract objects
like plans), it is possible that underspeciﬁed references occur without any loss of understand-
ability on the part of the reader/listener, and propose an underspeciﬁed DRT representation to
cope with these cases.
Poesio and Artstein (2005) argue that coreference annotation can (and possibly should) use
underspeciﬁed representations to cope with these ambiguous cases. In a study with 18 subjects
in an annotation setting, they found that, in the text used, 42.6% of the markables were at least
implicitly ambiguous (in the sense that at least two antecedents were chosen by more than two
coders each), of which a little more than one third were marked explicitly by annotators when
they had been told to do so.
These results are also highly relevant for large-scale annotation efforts like ACE1, the dutch
KNACK-2002 corpus (Hoste and Daelemans, 2004), or the ongoing effort to add coreference
annotation to the text of the German T¨ uBa-D/Z treebank (Hinrichs et al., 2005), since these
ambiguities may well occur not only in spoken dialogues but also in edited newspaper texts.
In the remaining part of this paper, we will provide a qualitative analysis of disagreements
in the T¨ uBa-D/Z corpus, to show that a certain class of cases, namely those involving vague
objects, are prone to genuine ambiguities and lead to a decrease in annotator agreement where
1http://projects.ldc.upenn.edu/ace/they occur. This class includes, but is not limited to, the cases that Poesio and Reyle call the
’meronymy pattern’.
We contend that ambiguities are interesting, even given that we do not wish to annotate
these ambiguities explicitly, since we can raise the annotator’s awareness of these ambiguities
and propose a resolution of these ambiguities based on independent principles2.
2 Data examined
In the referentially annotated T¨ uBa-D/Z corpus of written German, we examined the nominal
coreference annotations for the 60 articles that had been annotated by two annotators. Inter-
annotatoragreement(asindicatedbyF-measurefollowingVilainetal.(1995)’sscoringscheme)
is at 0.83 for all mentions3. After normalizing differing spans by mapping them to nodes in the
treebank using fuzzy matching, and projecting every markable to the span where it should be
following the annotation guide, the inter-annotator agreement improves to F=0.85, which is a
visible improvement but less than what Hirschman et al. (1997) found in their study when they
let annotators discuss and agree on markables and their boundaries. For full NP mentions only
(excluding NPs in predicative positions, as in ‘Peter is [the greatest fool of all]’), the agreement
is at F=0.78.
We classiﬁed every full NP mention that any one of the two annotators had annotated as
being coreferent with another mention (including pronominal mentions) with a semantic class
label using the following categorization4:
• Persons (PER) are natural persons, including plural person NPs used metonymously to
denote some organization (the conservatives, the policemen).
• Organizations (ORG) are formal groupings of persons that are seen as a single actor (e.g.
political parties, sports clubs, research institutes)
• Events (EVT) are abstract objects that have a (more or less well-deﬁned) temporal bound-
ary and often result in a change in the state of affairs (e.g. bombings, ﬁnancial mergers,
strikes).
• Locations (LOC) are all geopolitical entities (countries, cities etc.) as well as geographi-
cal and physical features.
• Objects (Obj) are things that can be possessed and used and which are generally not seen
as being able to perform actions of their own. They may or may not have a material form
(as in bank accounts, or electronic books).
• Temporal entities (TMP) are regions of time that are referred to explicitly (e.g. the next
week, the eighth day of the strike, Christmas 2006).
• All the rest (Other) is a disconcerting hodge-podge comprising propositions, organiza-
tional roles (as opposed to the person ﬁlling that role), concepts, legal rights, plans etc.
that we did not want to distinguish further.
2As an example for such independent principles, consider ambiguous modiﬁer attachment in syntax annotation,
where ambiguities are usually solved by attaching to the higher candidate.
3Hirschman et al. (1997) also give an agreement ﬁgure of F=0.83, but they counted the elements of appositional
constructions as two markables linked by a coreference relation while we count appositional constructions as a
single markable. Because these additional links between appositions are trivial to annotate, the agreement on the
remaining relations is probably slightly better in T¨ uBa-D/Z than in MUC-7.
4The annotation of semantic classes was performed by the author of this paper. Zaenen et al. (2004), who did
a study with 3 annotators for a slightly ﬁner coding scheme, found that the agreement they got for this task was
quite good (κ = 0.92).(total) (disagree) error rate
pl sg all pl sg all pl sg all
PER 156 297 453 33 25 58 0.21 0.08 0.13
ORG 38 310 348 8 39 47 0.21 0.13 0.14
LOC 12 204 217 1 41 42 0.08 0.20 0.19
EVT 31 165 196 5 42 47 0.16 0.26 0.24
Obj 29 80 109 11 11 22 0.38 0.14 0.20
TMP — 14 14 — 5 5 — 0.36 0.36
Other 16 95 111 1 18 19 0.06 0.19 0.17
Table 1: Disagreements by number (singular/plural)
Looking at the disagreement shown in table 1, we can see that there is signiﬁcant interaction
between disagreements and semantic classes (χ2 = 20.77, p < 0.01), and between disagree-
ments and number (χ2 = 4.76, p < 0.05). Single persons, organizations and objects have
the lowest error rates5, whereas plural objects and temporal entities (which only occured with
singular number) exhibit an unusually high error rate.
Several error types contribute to these discrepancies. If we distinguish between ‘hard’ dis-
agreements, where both annotators’ versions can be seen as equally valid, and soft errors, where
it is obvious that one of the annotators just overlooked a possible antecedent, we ﬁnd that many
of the errors for single locations and all of the errors for temporal mentions are indeed soft er-
rors and would possibly proﬁt highly from better annotation tools: in these cases, the location or
the temporal region is uniquely (and thus unambiguously) speciﬁed, but since they are always
uniquely speciﬁed (and never anaphoric in the sense that context information from a speciﬁc
antecedent was needed for the interpretation). Additionally, keeping track of the temporal and
spatial locations in a story is usually not required, while keeping track of the protagonists of
a story (usually persons and/or organizations) is required for its understanding. In three of the
ﬁve erronous coreference decisions regarding temporal mentions, we found that, to realize the
coreference relations between the mentions, it would be necessary to make certain inferences
that a cursory reader will almost certainly not make.
Forpluralobjects, anothersourceofdisagreementisoverrepresented, theambiguitywhether
a given mention is used in a speciﬁc or in a generic sense, typically when a class of objects is
denoted. As a simpliﬁed example, the sentence “John threw out the red shirts” can have a
speciﬁc reading (where John acts on a well-deﬁned set of shirts, moving them from his closet to
the dustbin) and a generic one (where John expresses his attitude toward the class of red shirts,
and he’s less likely to buy one again).
The ‘hard’ disagreements in the PER class mostly involve groups of persons, which are
not generic, but the actual set of persons that they denote is vague, and annotators decided
differently on the question whether two vague objects corefer. Problems with vague refer-
ence are usually suspected with event coreference, which is why general event coreference is
usually excluded from annotation schemes that are geared towards the reliable annotation of
large text quantities, but the presence of this problem for groups of persons (and organizations)
suggests that a principled treatment of vague reference would beneﬁt not only the coreference
annotation for nominalized events, but also that for groups of persons, which are as important
(disagreement-wise) as the former.
5We deﬁned the error rate as the ratio between the number of disagreements and the number of markables that
were coreferent to another markable in at least one annotator’s version.3 Coreference of Vague Objects
In order to be able to notice, discuss, and possibly resolve ambiguities (or equivalently, argue
that a certain annotation is right, wrong, or left ambiguous by the annotation guidelines), we
need to complement our na¨ ıve understanding with a (semi-)formal description of what coref-
erence is; it is mostly uncontroversial that we build some kind of model from the text, with
mentions referring to entities that either have been mentioned in the text or can be accommo-
dated in the model. In terms of the scene that the text describes, it is unlikely that several
blatantly dissimilar interpretations arise for the kind of text that we are investigating. Thus, am-
biguities must be attributed to the reference relation between mentions on one hand and pieces
of modeled reality on the other hand, and identity conditions between these pieces, which are
both non-issues with concrete referents, or some vague referents like mountains that can be in-
dividuated by their peak. Without an obvious individuation criterion, coreference decisions can
become difﬁcult.
Consider the following sentences, taken from the T¨ uBa-D/Z corpus6:
(1) a. F¨ ur ein “barrierefreies Bremen” gingen deshalb gestern [1 mehrere hundert behin-
derte Menschen] auf die Straße – und demonstrierten f¨ ur “Gleichstellung statt Barri-
eren”.
b. “Warum immer wir?” fragten [2 die Versammelten] deshalb auf Plakaten.
It is intuitively clear that the person groups from mentions 1 and 2 have a large overlap, but,
seen in isolation, the real-world extensions of the two mentions do not seem to be identical, as
not every demonstrator had disabilities, and neither did every one of them carry a poster with
the indicated question. On the other hand, saying that 1 and 2 denote different entities would
miss the point, since the author meant to talk about the group of demonstrators and not several
largely overlapping subsets of it.
We would like to treat the demonstrators as one entity that is described by several predica-
tions and not several distinct entities, just as we would not want to talk about multiple clouds
when there is just one cloud in the sky to which several predicates apply differently on different
parts.
If we treat the conditions of being disabled and of carrying posters as incidental and instead
use the demonstrating as the deﬁning property of the crowd of mentions 1 and 2, we can coerce
the individual predicates of being disabled, and wanting to push for a “barrier-free Bremen”, to
(vague) predicates of groups by taking a majority view.
That is, the article talks about a crowd of demonstrators that
• wanted to push for a “barrier-free Bremen”
• comprised (about) several hundred people
• consisted (in a signiﬁcant proportion) of disabled people
• had some posters asking “Why always us?” (cumulative reading)
Intuitively, this is much closer to the intended interpretation than talking about several over-
lapping but not identical crowds. But we have to make sure that we will not run into problems
this way, or at least that we know it when we do — if we point to a crowd, it is unclear whether
we mean this set of persons or another one that differs in only one person belonging or not to
the set, giving us multiple equally possible extensions for that crowd.
6Translation: (a) For a “barrier-free Bremen”, [1 several hundred disabled people] went onto the streets yes-
terday — and demonstrated for “Equality, not Barriers”. (b) “Why always us?” [2 the congregated] asked on the
posters.The problem of vagueness in reference has been studied extensively (see Weatherson, 2005),
and we will use Smith and Brogaard (2001)’s superevaluationist account of reference to vague
objects and predications of these objects.
Smith and Brogaard posit that you can, for a vague object, give multiple precisiﬁcations
relevant to a certain context – for a cloud, several cloud-shaped sets of water molecules, for a
crowd, multiple sets of persons, or, for a lorry loaded with oranges, the lorry with or without
the oranges.
A statement is then judgeable and true (supertrue) iff we can instantiate every singular term
with a corresponding family of aggregates and that, however we select a single possibility from
the family of aggregates, the statement is true.
If we construct a logical form out of the sentences from the crowd example and model all
possible crowd extensions, the conclusion (“the crowd from sentence (1) is the same as the
crowd from sentence (2)”) will obviously not be supertrue since we could always choose two
different extensions for the two crowds. Saying that two crowds are the same when they have a
large overlap would partially solve the problem, but leads us to Sorites-style paradoxes where
the crowd of demonstrators is the same crowd as another crowd etc., where the last crowd
of the chain is the same as a crowd totally different from the ﬁrst one. We can posit identity
independentlyoftheextensionforobjectswherewehaveanindividuationcriterion, forexample
the peak for a mountain, or for humans, but not for crowds.
This is where the idea of a (cognitive) model comes in, since we can conceptually separate
the process of model construction from the process of model veriﬁcation (i.e. seeing if the
model ﬁts the real world, or asking questions about possible conclusions). This is also done
in SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003), where the construction of the discourse model is done
using a quantiﬁer-free default logic, whereas the semantics of the model itself uses a monotonic
logic without quantiﬁers. In a similar fashion, we want to handle vague predications in the
semantics of the discourse model itself, but not in the construction of the model.
For our crowd example, we could construct a discourse model with a single referent for
both mentions and supplement it with possible extensions of the crowd, of consisting of several
hundred people etc. such that the predications of the text (in the form of the discourse model,
withthegivensetsofpossibleextensions)aresupertrue. Butwecouldalsoconstructadiscourse
model with two separate referents for the two mentions. What keeps us from positing another
model with two (or even more) overlapping but unrelated crowds?
We could argue that there is nothing that keeps us from positing a model with two overlap-
ping crowds that are both mentioned in the text, and that the distinction between the one-crowd
and the two-crowd model is best left underspeciﬁed. But we would like to be able to choose
as the preferred interpretation one of the two possible discourse models (which we posit can
both be constructed from the text and are both supertrue when evaluated in conjunction with
plausible predicate extensions).
Intermsofthenumberofentitiesinvolved, amodelwithmultipleoverlappingcrowdswould
be larger, and by positing more identity relations we decrease the number of entities in the
model. We can say that we only want to consider minimal models, as proposed by Gardent and
Webber (2001), more speciﬁcally what they call locally minimal.
This leaves open the question what to do when there are multiple minimal models that all
make the statements of the discourse judgeable and true, and it can be argued that an approach
using underspeciﬁcation like the one of Poesio and Reyle (2001) is still needed for these cases.
Poesio and Reyle’s example of “hooking up the engine to the boxcar and sending it to London”
is not disambiguated by our criteria since we cannot distinguish between the interpretation
where the train is referenced as a (vague) extension of the boxcar and that where it is referencedas a (vague) extension of the engine, at least not using domain-independent principles. But our
account correctly predicts that “stirring up the butter and the sugar and cooking it on a stove” is
awkward, since the mixed substance cannot be seen as a vague extension of either of the two.
We also hope that using underspeciﬁcation, or ad-hoc ambiguity resolution, is needed for
fewer cases and can be used with greater conﬁdence, allowing for a better compromise between
simplicity and annotation quality than relying on multiple annotators to make consistent ad-hoc
judements.
4 Conclusion
We have provided a quantitative analysis of disagreements in a referentially annotated corpus,
the T¨ uBa-D/Z corpus of written German, and shown that entities with vague extensions like
groups of persons are subject to greater-than-average disagreement among annotators. We pro-
posedatheoreticalframeworkbasedonSmithandBrogaard(2001)’ssuperevaluationistaccount
of reference to vague objects and minimal models that can help to better understand and resolve
difﬁcult cases of coreference, complementing Poesio and Reyle (2001)’s approach by stating
further conditions on when underspeciﬁcation is really necessary. A further study is needed to
show if and by how much the improved theoretical framework leads to better agreement among
annotators and, generally, better annotation quality, as we hope and at least van Deemter and
Kibble (2000) seem to imply in their article.
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